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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
JULIETTE TURLEY, : 
Plaintiff-Appellee, : Case No. 970020-CA 
vs. : Oral Argument 
Priority 15 
ROBERT WALTERS TURLEY, : 
Defendant-Appellant. : 
JURISDICTION 
Jurisdiction is conferred on this Court by Utah Code Ann. 
§ 78-2a-3(2)(i) (1996). The final judgment was entered December 4, 
1996. (R. 190-83.l) Mr. Turley filed his notice of appeal 30 days 
later, on January 3, 1997. (R. 194-93.) The notice of appeal was 
filed within 3 0 days of the entry of judgment and was therefore 
timely. Utah R. App. P. 4(a). 
ISSUES PRESENTED 
1. Where a divorce decree acknowledges the possibility that 
an obligor may lose his job but orders child support and alimony 
based on the current employment and provides that the child support 
and alimony will continue at those levels only so long as the 
obligor's income does not change, does the actual occurrence of the 
1
 The documents in the trial court file are assembled in 
reverse chronological order. As a result, the pagination on each 
document is in reverse numerical order. 
job loss constitute a change of circumstance justifying modifica-
tion of the child support and alimony? 
2. Where a divorce decree provides that "in the event the 
defendant's income does not terminate, the amounts paid for child 
support shall continue , does the support obligation 
terminate when the income terminates? 
Although an appellate court typically "reviews a trial court's 
modification determination for an abuse of discretion," Hill v. 
Hill. 841 P.2d 722, 724 (Utah Ct. App. 1992), the trial court's 
determination in this case involves solely an interpretation of the 
wording of the decree of divorce. The trial court treated the 
issue as having been presented by a motion for summary judgment. 
(R. 158.) The only issues presented involve the interpretation of 
the decree. "Since appellate courts are in as good a position as 
trial courts to interpret court rulings . . . , [this court] should 
review the trial court's interpretation of its order for correct-
ness." Stevensen v. Goodson, 924 P.2d 339, 346 (Utah 1996). 
DETERMINATIVE PROVISIONS 
Appellant is not aware of any constitutional provisions, 
statutes, ordinances, rules, or regulations whose interpretation is 
determinative of the appeal. 
2 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Nature Of The Case. This is an appeal from a final order 
dismissing appellants petition for modification of a divorce 
decree. 
B. Course Of Proceedings And Disposition Below. The parties 
were divorced by a decree entered February 9, 1996. (R. 95-88.) 
On May 30, 1996, Mr. Turley filed his Verified Petition to Amend 
Decree of Divorce. (R. 122-119.) A trial on the petition was held 
October 10, 1996. (R. 159-58.) At the conclusion of trial, 
however, the parties stipulated that there was only one factual 
issue (a $1,400.00 payment which is not at issue on this appeal), 
and agreed that Mrs. Turley's trial memorandum could be treated as 
a memorandum supporting summary judgment. (R. 158.) Mr. Turley 
responded to the "memorandum for summary judgment" (R. 168-64), and 
Mrs. Turley replied. (R. 173-69.) 
The trial court entered its Memorandum Decision on November 
15, 1996, finding the issues in favor of Mrs. Turley. (R. 182-77.) 
On December 4, 1996, the court entered its Findings of Fact, 
Conclusions of Law and Order granting Mrs. Turley7s motion for 
summary judgment and dismissing Mr. Turley's petition for modifica-
tion. (R. 190-83.) 
C. Statement of Facts. On September 28, 1994, after 27 
years of marriage, Mrs. Turley filed a complaint seeking a divorce 
from Mr. Turley. (R. 7-1.) At that time, Mr. Turley was employed 
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as President and CEO of Intermountain Farmers Association, but that 
position was terminated effective August 1, 1995. (R. 65.) 
Pursuant to his employment agreement with IFA, Mr. Turley's full 
income of $12 3,198.00 per year continued through May 31, 1996, and 
IFA and Mr. Turley had tentatively contemplated ongoing compensa-
tion of one-fourth of that amount for four years. (Id.) 
The divorce case was set for trial December 14, 1995, but the 
parties reached a stipulation which was approved by the court. (R. 
85.) The formal documents implementing the stipulation and 
granting the decree of divorce were entered February 9, 1996. (R. 
95-88, 103-96.) 
Paragraph 7 of the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law 
entered in connection with the divorce acknowledged that Mr. 
Turley's income would terminate: 
The defendant has represented to the 
Court that his income with Intermountain 
Farmers will terminate on May 31, 1996, at 
which time he will no longer receive income 
from Intermountain Farmers; however, it is 
reasonable that in the event the defendant's 
income does not terminate, the amounts paid 
for child support and alimony shall continue 
as set forth above. In the event the defen-
dant's income, which has historically been 
$181,000.00 per year, should be that amount, 
and whether he is employed with Intermountain 
Farmers Association or any other company, or 
has income in said amount, then alimony paid 
by the defendant to the plaintiff shall 
increase in the amount that child support 
decreases when the minor children reach their 
majority, but only so long as the defendant's 
income is based upon historical earnings of 
$181,000.00 per year. 
(R. 101.) 
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The Decree of Divorce similarly noted the anticipated 
termination of Mr. Turley's income. Paragraph 3 of the decree 
ordered Mr. Turley to pay $1,300.00 per month as support for the 
two minor children. Paragraph 4 ordered Mr. Turley to pay 
$1,500.00 per month as alimony. (R. 94.) Paragraph 7 of the 
decree made those payments conditional on Mr. Turley7s continued 
employment: 
The defendant's income from Intermountain 
Farmers will terminate on May 31, 1996, at 
which time he will no longer receive income 
from Intermountain Farmers; however, in the 
event the defendant's income does not 
terminate, the amounts paid for child support 
shall continue as set forth above. With 
respect to alimony, alimony shall increase in 
the amount that child support decreases when 
the minor children reach their majority, only 
so long as the defendant's income is based 
upon historical earnings of $181,000.00 per 
year. 
(R. 93.) 
The $9,583.00 per month Mr. Turley was receiving from IFA did 
terminate effective May 31, 1996. (R. 124.) Mr. Turley attempted 
to find other work, but at the time he filed his petition to 
modify, he was only earning approximately $1,000.00 per month. 
(Id.) The trial court denied his requested modification, and Mr. 
Turley thereafter perfected this appeal. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The parties' divorce decree noted that Mr. Turley's income 
would terminate only a few months after entry of the decree. 
Rather than attempting to predict the future, the divorce decree 
made an award of alimony and child support based on Mr. Turley's 
then current income and provided that the alimony and child support 
would continue at those levels until the income terminated. 
Implied in the decree was the expectation that a modification would 
need to occur when Mr. Turley's post-IFA income became known. 
The trial court dismissed Mr. Turley's petition for 
modification based on the rule that a decree may be modified only 
upon proof of a substantial change in circumstances not 
contemplated at the time of the decree. Although Mr. Turley's loss 
of income was known at the time of the decree, the decree did not 
contemplate or account for the actual level of the reduced income. 
The decree must be read to give effect to all of its terms. Those 
terms include provisions that the alimony and child support will 
continue only so long as Mr. Turley's income continued at the IFA 
levels. The only internally consistent interpretation of the 
divorce decree is that the divorce decree anticipated the need for 
a future hearing after Mr. Turley's income became known. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
MR. TURLEY'S INABILITY TO EARN HIS PRIOR 
LEVEL OF INCOME WAS NOT A CIRCUMSTANCE 
CONTEMPLATED BY THE DECREE OF DIVORCE, 
Utah Code Ann. § 30-3-5(3) (1995) vests a divorce court with 
"continuing jurisdiction to make subsequent changes or new orders 
for the support and maintenance of the parties, the custody of the 
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children and their support . . . as is reasonable and necessary." 
A prerequisite to invoking the divorce court's continuing 
jurisdiction is proof of "a substantial change of circumstances 
subsequent to the decree, that was not originally contemplated 
within the decree itself." Woodward v. Woodward, 709 P.2d 393, 394 
(Utah 1985) . The trial court employed this principle to hold that 
because Mr. Turley's potential loss of income was known and in fact 
stated in the decree of divorce, Mr. Turley must continue to pay 
$2,800.00 in child support and alimony as though he were earning 
over $9,000.00 per month, although his current income is around 
$1,000.00 per month. This is obviously not fair nor was it 
contemplated by the parties or the court at the time of the divorce 
decree. 
The understanding of the parties and the divorce court is best 
represented in paragraph 7 of the Findings of Fact and Conclusions 
of Law, which states: 
The defendant has represented to the 
Court that his income with Intermountain 
Farmers will terminate on May 31, 1996, at 
which time he will no longer receive income 
from Intermountain Farmers; however, it is 
reasonable that in the event the defendant's 
income does not terminate, the amounts paid 
for child support and alimony shall continue 
as set forth above. In the event the defen-
dant's income, which has historically been 
$181,000.00 per year, should be that amount, 
and whether he is employed with Intermountain 
Farmers Association or any other company, or 
has income in said amount, then alimony paid 
by the defendant to the plaintiff shall 
increase in the amount that child support 
decreases when the minor children reach their 
majority, but only so long as the defendant's 
7 
income is based upon historical earnings of 
$181,000.00 per year. 
(R. 101.) 
In other words, the divorce court noted the probable future 
loss of income, but declined to forecast the future and explicitly 
decided only what support would be based on present income. This 
approach is consistent with Utah law. In MacLean v. MacLean. 523 
P.2d 862 (Utah 1974), the trial court anticipated that the wife 
would gain employment and that her need for alimony would be 
reduced. The trial court attempted to anticipate the probable 
employment by reducing alimony 5% each year. The Utah Supreme 
Court rejected such an attempt to divine the future and counseled: 
"We deem it best that the changes in alimony either downward or 
upward should be left to future determinations by the court under 
its continuing jurisdiction." 523 P.2d at 863. 
The divorce court in the instant matter did just what the 
MacLean court advised. The court set alimony and child support 
based on the only facts which were known, which was the income at 
the time of the decree. The court also specifically stated that 
these amounts would continue only so long as the income continued. 
The decisions relied upon by the trial court and Mrs. Turley 
below do not support the dismissal of Mr. Turley's petition to 
modify. In Durfee v. Durfee, 796 P.2d 713 (Utah Ct. App. 1990), 
the trial court found that the husband's income had increased by 
$16,000.00 over the ten years following the divorce. The husband 
characterized the increase as modest and argued that such an 
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increase would have been clearly "contemplated" by the parties at 
the time of the decree. The Court of Appeals rejected that 
argument and stated: 
The fact that the parties may have anticipated 
an increase of income in their own minds or in 
their discussions does not mean that the 
decree itself contemplates the change. In 
order for a material change in circumstances 
to be contemplated in a divorce decree, there 
must be evidence, preferably in the form of a 
provision within the decree itself, that the 
trial court anticipated the specific change. 
796 P.2d at 716. The Durfee court illustrated this quotation by 
citation to Dana v. Dana, 789 P.2d 726 (Utah Ct. App. 1990). In 
that case, the trial court anticipated that the wife, who earned 
$3,000.00 the year prior to the divorce, would soon earn 
approximately $10,000.00 to $12,000.00 per year in gross income. 
Four years after the divorce, the wife actually was earning 
$17,000.00 per year in gross income. The Court of Appeals held 
that because part of this increase was contemplated at the time of 
the divorce, the actual increased income was only $5,000.00 to 
$7,000.00 for purposes of determining whether a substantial change 
in circumstances had occurred. 789 P.2d at 729. 
These cases actually support Mr. Turley's position. The rule 
established by these cases is that where a trial court makes a 
support order which is intended to account for anticipated future 
changes, the actual occurrence of those anticipated changes will 
not constitute a "substantial change of circumstances." The decree 
9 
in the instant case did not "contemplate" the loss by making a 
support order which would account for the future income loss. 
Moore v. Moore, 872 P.2d 1054 (Utah Ct. App. 1994), also fails 
to support the position of Mrs. Turley in the trial court below. 
The court held in that case that the initial support amounts were 
set based on an expectation that the wife would soon be employed as 
a school teacher. The court accordingly held that the wife's 
actually obtaining that employment was not a substantial change in 
circumstances.2 
The decree in the instant case expressly acknowledges that Mr. 
Turley's income from his then current employer would end, but the 
parties did not know nor did the divorce court forecast what his 
income would be thereafter. The divorce decree does not, there-
fore, contemplate or account for the future income. To the 
contrary, the decree expressly contemplates income at the level of 
the decree. Mr. Turley does not now earn that level of income, and 
the trial court's order dismissing his petition to modify the 
decree must be reversed. 
2
 Part of the rationale of Moore squarely conflicts with the 
holding in Durfee. The Moore court based its holding on evidence 
that "[a]t the time the decree was entered, the parties had 
discussed Mrs. Moore's plan to recertify as a school teacher or to 
obtain a Master's degree in sociology." 872 P.2d at 1055 (under-
lining added). In Durfee, the court disapproved relying on the 
parties' discussions. The Durfee court stated: "The fact that the 
parties may have anticipated an increase of income in their own 
minds or in their discussions does not mean that the decree itself 
contemplates the change." 796 P.2d at 716. 
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POIK-
THB DIVORCE DECREE AND DU^PORTING FINDINGS 
PROVIDE THAT SUPPORT WAS TO CONTINUE ONLY A~ 
LONG AS MR. TURLEY WAS EARNING $181/000 PER " 
The issue in the instant case is not whether the change i n 
c contemplated. The parties and court clearly knew 
at Ln<_ L A U V W*. w.ie divorce decree 
terminate only a few months after the decree The parties did not 
know i"h:*t hi- income would then be. Rather f h e issue ^ ^his case 
is whether t:;a -..-._„ ivorce ..acrcu 
$2,800.00-per-month support obligation woula continue even after 
h :i s :i i lcoxne stopped. The interpretation of +"H^ decree is a question 
of i a w anci is reviewed by t.. . _. oLbvenacn v » 
Goodson, 924 P. 2d 'J , I'-h ("tan .f-^ * Tr.t- same rules of 
construction arr ,,T " ^^ " f --ii-*^ ns^rument. Bettinger v. 
Bettinger, '*-* • 
be interpreted in a .*; t. give effect * : , s provisions. 
V.« - - - Redevelopment Agency of Salt Lake City, »f > P . 2d 
7 5 5, 769 (Utah Ct. Ar>p. 199r) "'|\ i- |.he exLe.. I I I I l 
the decree is ambiguous or confusing , "the entire record -.ay be 
resorted -*-~ ^"~ * •-  purpose construing the judgment." 
Bettinger,
 x__ r luium rcn.^ ^ lty f uucm ^^-J_^, . . unsiqi. ^ w. "5 
P.2d 446, 450 (Utah 1978)). 
Application of these rules supports or*^ v one conclusion: The 
divorce decree provided 1:1 ic , t t e 
only so long as Mr. Turley was still o a r n m n $181 •. 00,00 per year. 
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Paragraph 7 of the decree provides that the child support shall 
continue "in the event the defendants income does not terminate." 
The corollary of the statement is that the child support will not 
continue if defendant7s income terminated. While not as clear as 
for child support, the same paragraph also indicates that ongoing 
alimony is contingent upon defendant's income remaining at 
$181,000.00 per year. 
Any uncertainty in the intent of the divorce decree is 
dispelled by reference to paragraph 7 of the divorce court's 
findings. (R. 101, quoted above in the Statement of Facts.) If 
the decree contemplates what Mrs. Turley claims, that Mr. Turley's 
$2,800 monthly support obligation was to continue even after he 
lost his income, then the findings do not support the decree. The 
findings unambiguously state that "it is reasonable that in the 
event defendant's income does not terminate, the amounts paid for 
child support and alimony shall continue as set forth above." This 
Court should reject any interpretation of the decree which causes 
to decree to be unsupported by the findings. 
The only interpretation of the divorce decree which gives 
effect to all of its terms and which makes sense in light of the 
findings is that the support obligations were to continue only so 
long as Mr. Turley continued to earn $181,000.00 per year. That 
income stream has now ended. Mr. Turley is now entitled to a 
reduction of his support obligations commensurate with his current 
income. 
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< 'i N C I I U S I O N • 
T -: ? -uDDortinq findings must be read to 
require payment ui simony .,;.^  w.\,nu - upper t ...t the l i < > 'v-ieiie.e 
levels only so long as Parley's income remained at the same 
3' r I - • • . decree acknowledges the possibility 
that icome „ . * *.* terminate, the support awar ds I :: i 1 :: t: 
"contemplate" the reduced income; the decree does just the 
conn. 'pr.rr- -x:smDlates " ' , is base~ "- •*" * ncome of 
$181; vuuwu
 P c , . , . . ^  , experience- L 
change of circumstances from those "contemplated11 t trie decree of 
cl i • in ' >r ^nti+lnd to modification of the decree, The trial 
courtl" s dismissa 1 of his petit!um i I i 111" i d i i. J C. 11 i III i 11111" . I h e 
reversed• 
DATED th 1 fS d~- of h pri 1 , 1997, 
LESLIE W. SLAUGH, for: 
HOWARD, LEWIS & PETERSEN 
Attorneys for Defendant-Appellant 
MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that two true and correct copies of the 
foregoing were mailed to the following, postage prepaid, this 18th 
day of April, 1997. 
Rosemond G. Blakelock, Esq. 
Blakelock & Stringer 
3 7 East Center, 2nd Floor 
Provo, UT 84606 ^ — x 
J:\LWS\TURLEY.BRF 
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APPENDIX "A" 
Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order 
(R. 190-183) 
*•'£ tiftf* 
*fi 
-if 
Rosemond Blakelock #6183 
BLAKELOCK AND STRINGER, P.A. 
Attorney(s) for Plaintiff 
37 East Center, 2nd Floor 
Provo, Utah 84606 
Telephone: (801) 375-7678 
% • 
n ^ r->^cmxE) f^i G'^fifs 
I N T H E F 0 U R T H DISTRICT COURT OF UTAH COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
JULIETTE TIJ RI E !:n! , 
P l a i n t i f f , 
v . 
ROBERT WALTERS TURLEY, 
Defendant. 
* 
* 
* 
* 
* 
* 
F J N i J i N l 11 IK F A C T , 
I : O N « ! . . 1 J J U X U M J O F LAW AND 
UNDER 
Case No. 944402269 
Judge Howard Maetani 
This matter came before the Court for trial — October 1 0, 
1996. Plaintiff Juliette Turley was present epresented by 
counsel Rosemond c-sL^ e-u/ >*s 
present and represented by counsel jr Petersen. 
The Court granted *-^ ^ =.*-i--^ c - ^ %/- • r> submit their proposed 
Findings t 
replies. No Findings Fact ana Conclusion^ ui ^ a* *eie 
submitted. However, Defendant submitted a Memorandum in Opposition 
I 1 1 II1 II in i i l l i I  II I II I in i H I I i mi iiHIIiiiii 11 , h n i q o m e i l II:: , 
and Plaintiff submitted a response to Defendant Memorandum i 
Opposition, to Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment: on October 
2 8 , 1 9 9 6 IE ] • i I i : ! :::, ii II: Ill: I . 1 , II : : • • • l a i : t : .er befor e 
October 28, 1996, i fhun Plaintiff fi;ed a Motion to Submit. 
The Court having heard the testimony of witnesses, considered 
the exhibits and arguments of counsel, reviewed the submitted 
documents, and being fully advised in the premises, now makes the 
following: 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. The Court finds that the Plaintiff and Defendant were 
divorced on February 9, 1996. 
2. The Court finds that the divorce was granted pursuant to 
stipulation. 
3. The Court finds that paragraph 4 of the Divorce Decree sets 
out that the Defendant is to pay the Plaintiff alimony in the sum 
of $1,500*00 per month for the Plaintiff's support and maintenance, 
the sum is to be paid in semi-monthly installments of $750.00 each 
to be paid on the 5th and 20th of each month. 
4. The Court finds that paragraph 3 of the divorce decree sets 
out that the Defendant is to pay the Plaintiff child support in the 
sum of $1,300*00 per month for support and maintenance of the two 
minor children. Child support is to continue until the minor 
children reach the age of 18 years of graduate from high school 
with their normal matriculated class, whichever occurs last. 
5. The Court finds that paragraph 7 of the divorce decree 
states: 
The defendant's income from Intermountain Farmers will 
terminate on May 31, 1996, at which time he will no longer 
receive income from Intermountain farmers; however, in the 
event the defendant's income does not terminate, the amounts 
paid for child support shall continue as set forth above. With 
respect to alimony, alimony shall increase-in the amount that 
child support decreases when the minor children reach their 
majority, only so long as the defendant's income is based upon 
hlS"LL 
6 "he Court finds thar the Defendant uas applied to modify 
the amount of alimony. 
Based upon the forgoing Findings of Fact the Court now ma kes 
the following; 
CONCLUSIONS OF " " 
] II: le Cour t has jurisdi z ti 01 i c:> y ei: l::l:i< = p ax: Li e s ::i i: 1 th :i s a ::: t:::i • ::: it i 
)ver the subject matter \;t this action. 
tinuing jurisdictior *--- make subsequent 
changes or new orders for . ..• L»U|JIA. -udjicw f I he 
parties. Utah Code Or----:' ., i 
3 2 imcernina "*:he circumstances under which a court may modify 
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I The decree of divorce specifically states: 
The defendant's income from, Intermountain Farmers will 
terminate on May 31, 1996, at which time he will no longer 
receive income from Intermountain farmers; however, in the 
event the defendant's income doe not terminate, the amounts 
paid for child support shall continue as set forth above. With 
respect to alimony, alimony shall increase in the amount that 
child support decreases when the minor children reach their 
majority, only so long as the defendant's income is based upon 
historical earnings of $181,000.00 per year. 
The language of the divorce decree' is plain on it's face. The 
parties did contemplate the fact that the Defendant could lose his 
income from Intermaountain Farmers. Paragraph 7 of the divorce 
decree specifically addresses this contingency. It states that if 
the Defendant's income does not terminate, that the child support 
will continue as set out in the decree. The divorce decree at 
paragraph 7 states that Plaintiff's income from Intermountain 
Farmers will terminate on May 31, 1996. This statement is clear 
evidence that the parties knew the Plaintiff would lose his 
employment. 
This paragraph when taken in whole plainly indicates the fact 
the Defendant would lose his income from Intermountain Farmers was 
contemplated and contingencies for child support were included in 
the document. Paragraph 7 particularly explicitly refers to the 
termination of his employment, yet there is nothing in the decree 
indicating agreement to alter alimony when this happened. 
Defendant argues that paragraph 7 contemplates a reduction in child 
support upon termination of the employment. Defendant argues that 
the language indicating that child support would not decrease 
indicates an agreement to reduce the child support on the 
termination of the Defendant's employment with Intermountain 
farmers. The fact that child support may or may not have been 
anticipated as being modified is not dispositive in this case. The 
alimony and child support provisions are handled In separate 
paragraphs. The Court therefore must address them separately. The 
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be considered a change in circumstances, The parties obviously 
contemplated that Mrs. Moore would earn approximately $ 1300 
at the time the divorce decree was entered. Mrs. Moore's 
stable level of income was anticipated at the time of the 
divorce when the original alimony award was set. Thus, the 
court incorrectly determined that Mrs. Moore's present* t^-able 
income was a substantial change in her material 
circumstances. 
In sum, the court's findings do not support a determination 
that a substantial change in material circumstances not 
contemplated at the time of the entry of the original decree 
has occurred. We therefore reverse the court's determination 
of a substantial change in circumstances and remand for a 
reinstatement of the original $ 1050 alimony award. 
The case at bar is similar in that the parties obviously knew 
the Plaintiff's employment was going to terminate in May and knew 
Thi :ii s • =!! si I t i i a s ai i I::::i • :::! pated and 
contemplated DV the parties yet they did nui 'cake account of this 
in setting alimony. 
6. In addition, the Court in Moore faced an issue of child 
support. The divorce decree said that the child support obligation 
ceased when the children reached majority. Mr. Moore petitioned to 
terminate the alimony obligation because the children had all 
become emancipated and Mrs. Moore had a stable income. The Utah 
Court of Appeals did not reach the merits of whether a child 
reaching majority constituted a substantial change in circumstances 
saying, "It was certainly a circumstance that was contemplated at 
the time the decree was entered, id. at 1055. This Court therefore 
does not decide if the change in Defendant's income is a 
substantial, material change in circumstances as this change was 
undoubtedly contemplated at the time the divorce decree was 
entered. 
7. For the above stated reasons, the Court finds no grounds 
for modification of the divorce decree based on changed 
circumstances contemplated at the time the divorce decree was 
entered. The divorce decree explicitly refers to the fact that the 
Defendant would lose his income from Intermountain Farmers. Thus 
the Court cannot now alter the decree. 
8. Each party should pay their own attorney's fees and costs 
in this matter. 
BASED upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of 
Law, and for good cause appearing, the Court issues the following; 
ORDER 
1. The Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment is granted, 
and the Petition for Modification is hereby dismissed with 
prejudice. 
2. The Court cannot now alter the decree of divorce, 
3. Each party shall pay their own attorney's fees and costs in 
this matter. 
DATED this A. day of ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ y . 1996. 
OUHi ,0 
APPROVED AS TO FORM: 
Don R. Petersen, Esq. 
NOTICE TO DEFENDANT'S ATTORNEY 
TO: Don Petersen 
120 East 300 North 
Provo, Utah 84606 
You will please take notice that he undersigned attorney for 
Plaintiff will submit the above and foregoing Order to the 
Honorable Howard Maetani for his signature, upon the expiration of 
five (5) days from the date of this Notice, plus three (3) days for 
mailing, unless written objection is filed prior to that time, 
pursuant to Rule 4-504 of the Rules of Judicial Administration of 
the State of Utah-
DATED this 1996, 
JSEMOND G^BLAKELOCK 
Attorney fW-Plaintiff 
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Fourth Judicial District Coun 
Utah County, State of Utah. 
CARMA 8. SMITH, Clerk 
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURI ~^ 7Z^D5ni:r 
UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
JULIETTE TURLEY, 
Plaintiff, 
V. 
ROBERT WALTERS TURLEY, 
Defendant. 
MEMORANDUM DECISION 
Case No. 944402269 
Judge Howard H. Maetani 
This matter came before the Court for trial on October 10, 1996. Plaintiff Juliette 
Turley was present and represented by counsel Rosemond Blakelock. Defendant Robert 
Walters Turley was present and represented by counsel Don R. Petersen. 
The Court granted the parties 10 days to submit their proposed Findings of Fact and 
Conclusions of Law and 5 days to submit replies. No Findings of Fact and Conclusions of 
Law were submitted. However, Defendant submitted a Memorandum in Opposition to 
Plaintiffs Motion for Summary Judgement on October 23, 1996 and Plaintiff submitted a 
response to Defendants Memorandum in Opposition to Plaintiffs Motion for Summary 
Judgement on October 28, 1996. Plaintiff then brought the matter before the court on 
October 28, 1996 when Plaintiff filed a Motion to Submit. 
The Court, having heard the testimony of witnesses, considered the exhibits and 
arguments of counsel, reviewed the submitted documents, and being fully advised in the 
premises now makes the following: 
Memorandum Decision 
Findings of Fact 
1. The Plaintiff and Defendant were divorced on February 9, 1996. 
2. The divorce was granted pursuant to stipulation. 
3. Paragraph 4 of the divorce decree sets out that the Defendant is to pay the 
Plaintiff alimony in the sum of $1,500.00 per month for the Plaintiffs support and 
maintenance. This sum is to be paid in semi-monthly installments of $750.00 each to be paid 
on the 5th and 20th days of each month. 
4. Paragraph 3 of the divorce decree sets out that the Defendant is to pay to the 
Plaintiff child support in the sum of $1,300.00 per month for support and maintenance of the 
two minor children. Child support is to continue until the minor children reach the age of 18 
years or graduate from high school with their normal matriculated class, whichever occurs 
last 
5. Paragraph 7 of the divorce decree states: 
The defendant's income from Intermountain Fanners will terminate on May 31, 1996, 
at which time he will no longer receive income from Intermountain Farmers; however, 
in the event the defendant's income does not terminate, the amounts paid for child 
support shall continue as set forth above. With respect to alimony, alimony shall 
increase in the amount that child support decreases when the minor children reach 
their majority, only so long as the defendant's income is based upon historical 
earnings of $181,000.00 per year. 
6. Defendant has applied to modify the amount of alimony. 
Conclusions of Law 
1. This Court has jurisdiction over the parties to this action and over the subject 
matter of this action. 
2. The Court has "continuing jurisdiction to make subsequent changes or new 
orders for the support and maintenance of the parties. Utah Code Ann. §30-3-5(3). 
3. Concerning the circumstances under which a court may modify a divorce 
decree, the Utah Court of Appeals stated, "On a petition for a modification of a divorce 
decree, the threshold requirement for relief is a showing of substantial change of 
circumstances occurring since the entry of the decree and not contemplated in the decree 
itself." Durfee v. Durfee, 796 P.2d 713, 716 (Utah App. 1990)(quoting Stealer v. Stealer, 
713 P.2d 699, 701 (Utah 1985). Therefore, in addition to finding there was a substantial 
change of circumstance, the Court must also determine if the change of circumstance was 
contemplated at the time of the divorce decree. 
4. The decree of divorce specifically states: 
The defendant's income from Intermountain Farmers will terminate on May 31, 1996, 
at which time he will no longer receive income from Intermountain Farmers; however, 
in the event the defendant's^ income does not terminate, the amounts paid for child 
support shall continue as set forth above. With respect to alimony, alimony shall 
increase in the amount that child support decreases when the minor children reach 
their majority, only so long as the defendant's income is based upon historical 
earnings of $181,000.00 per year. 
The language of the divorce decree is plain on its face. The parties did contemplate 
the fact the Defendant could lose his income from Intermountain Farmers. Paragraph 7 of the 
divorce decree specifically addresses this contingency. It states that if the Defendant's 
income does not terminate, that the child support will continue as set out in the decree. The 
divorce decree in paragraph 7 states that Plaintiffs income from Intermountain Farmers will 
terminate on May 31, 1996. This statement is clear evidence that the parties knew the 
Plaintiff would lose his employment. 
This paragraph when taken in whole plainly indicates the fact the Defendant would 
lose his income from Intermountain Farmers was contemplated and contingencies for child 
support were included in the document Paragraph 7 particularly explicitly refers to the 
termination of his employment, yet there is nothing in the decree indicating agreement to alter 
alimony when this happened Defendant argues that paragraph 7 contemplates a reduction m 
child support upon termination of the employment Defendant argues that the language 
indicating that child support would not decrease indicates an agreement to reduce the child 
support on the termination of Defendant's employment with Intermountain Farmers The fact 
that child support may or may not have been anticipated as being modified is not dispositive 
in this case The alimony and child support provisions are handled in separate paragraphs 
The Court therefore must address them separately The fact that a reduction in child support 
may have been anticipated does not affect the question of alimony See Moore v Moore, 872 
P2d 1054, 1055-56 (Utah App 1994) 
5. In Moore v Moore, the Utah Court of Appeals held that a change in income is 
not a substantial change in circumstances if the change was anticipated at the time the divorce 
decree was entered The court said, "The trial court further determined that Mrs. Moore's 
employment and stable income constituted a substantial change in material circumstances 
However, the court m its own findings makes clear that this circumstance was also 
contemplated at the time the decree was entered " Id at 1056 The court went on to say 
The fact that Mrs Moore presently has a stable income cannot be considered a 
change of circumstances The parties obviously contemplated that Mrs Moore 
would earn approximately $1,300 at the time the divorce decree was entered 
Mrs Moore's stable level of income was anticipated at the time of the divorce 
when the original alimony award was set Thus, the court incorrectly 
determined that Mrs Moore's present, stable income was a substantial change 
m her material circumstances 
In sum, the court's findings do not support a determination that a substantial change in 
material circumstances not contemplated at the time of the entry of the original decree 
has occurred. We therefore reverse the court's determination of a substantial change 
in circumstances and remand for a reinstatement of the original $1050 alimony award. 
Id. at 1056. 
The case at bar is similar in that the parties obviously knew the Plaintiffs employment 
was going to terminate in May and knew his income would change. This event was 
anticipated and contemplated by the parties yet they did not take account of this in setting the 
alimony. 
6. In addition, the court in Moore faced an issue of child support. The divorce 
decree said that the child support obligation ceased when the children reached majority. Mr. 
Moore petitioned to terminate the alimony obligation because the children had all become 
emancipated and Mrs. Moore had a stable income. The Utah Court of Appeals did not reach 
the merits of whether a child reaching majority constituted a substantial change in 
circumstances saying, "It was certainly a circumstance that was contemplated at the time the 
decree was entered." Id. at 1055. This court therefore does not decide if the change in 
Defendants income is a substantial, material change in circumstances as this change was 
undoubtedly contemplated at the time the divorce decree was entered. 
7. For the above stated reasons, the Court finds no grounds for modification of the 
divorce decree based on changed circumstances contemplated at the time the divorce decree 
was entered. The divorce decree explicitly refers to the fact the Defendant would lose his 
income from Intermountain Farmers. Therefore, this Court cannot now alter the decree. 
8. Each party is to pay their own attorney's fees and costs in this matter. 
9. Attorney for Plaintiff is to prepare an Order in accordance with the above 
Memorandum Decision, and submit it to the Court for signature. 
Dated this day of November, 1996. 
BY THE COURT: 
HOWARD HNMAJ&FANI 
District Court Judge 
cc: 
Rosemond Blakelock, Esq. 
Don R. Petersen, Esq. 
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IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF UTAH COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
Our File No. 22,905 
JULIETTE TURLEY, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
ROBERT WALTERS TURLEY, 
Defendant. 
FINDINGS OF FACT AND 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
^Ui:27i /^ 
Case No. 94440002" 
Judge Howard H. Maetani 
The above-entitled matter came on regularly for trial on December 14, 1995. The 
plaintiff appeared in person and was represented by her attorney, Rosemond Blakelock; the 
defendant appeared in person and was represented by his attorney, Don R. Petersen. The parties 
entered into a stipulation, which was presented to the Court and approved. The Court being 
fully advised in the premises, now makes and enters the following: 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. The plaintiff and defendant were married on May 31, 1967, in Salt Lake City, 
Salt Lake County, Utah. 
2o During the course of the marriage, the parties have experienced irreconcilable 
differences making it impossible for them to continue their marriage relationship. 
3. The parties have two minor children, to-wit: Christine Turley, born March 6, 
1979; and Brian Judd Turley, born January 14, 1982. 
4. The plaintiff and defendant are both responsible individuals fit to be awarded 
the care, custody and control of the minor children of the parties. It is, therefore, reasonable 
and proper that the plaintiff and defendant be awarded joint custody of the minor children, with 
the plaintiff being awarded residential and physical custody of the children and the defendant 
being awarded reasonable rights of visitation. 
5. It is reasonable and proper that the defendant pay to the plaintiff child support 
in the sum of $1,300.00 per month for support and maintenance of the two minor children. 
Child support shall continue until the minor children reach the age of 18 years or graduate from 
high school with their normal matriculated class, whichever occurs last. Support payments shall 
be made by automatically transferring funds from the defendant's bank account to Zions First 
National Bank, 2100 South 900 West, Salt Lake City, Utah, account number 07346943, into 
plaintiffs bank account at Bank of American Fork, Alpine Branch, Alpine, Utah, account 
number 0186452; $650.00 on the 5th day of each month and $650.00 on the 20th day of each 
month. 
6. It is reasonable and proper that the defendant pay to the plaintiff alimony in the 
sum of $1,500.00 per month for the plaintiffs support and maintenance. 
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7. The defendant has represented to the Court that his income with Intermountain 
Farmers will terminate on May 31, 1996, at which time he will no longer receive income from 
Intermountain Farmers; however, it is reasonable that in the event the defendant's income does 
not terminate, the amounts paid for child support and alimony shall continue as set forth above. 
In the event the defendant's income, which has historically been $181,000.00 per year, should 
be that amount, and whether he is employed with Intermountain Farmers Association or any 
other company, or has income in said amount, then alimony paid by the defendant to the plaintiff 
shall increase in the amount that child support decreases when the minor children reach their 
majority, but only so long as the defendant's income is based upon historical earnings of 
$181,000.00 per year. 
8. It is reasonable and proper that the plaintiff be awarded all right, title and 
interest in and to the family home of the parties located at approximately 1221 North Grove 
Drive, Alpine, Utah, subject to the obligation owed thereon to Lomas Mortgage Company in the 
approximate amount of $20,000.00, which obligation the plaintiff shall assume and shall hold 
the defendant harmless therefrom. Said property consists of a home and approximately 1.1 
acres. Subject to an easement on the south side of the property in favor of the defendant or his 
successors in interest by which to gain access to the barn and property located thereon, said 
access shall be 24 feet in width. The defendant shall forthwith execute a quit claim deed 
conveying his interest in said property to the plaintiff. 
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9. It is reasonable and proper that the plaintiff be awarded all right, title and 
interest in and to a cabin in which the parties have an interest located in proximity to the Smith 
Moorehouse Reservoir in Summit County, Utah. 
10. It is reasonable and proper that the defendant be awarded approximately 3.89 
acres of property located on the east and west sides of the home property awarded to the 
plaintiff. The property shall be subject to an easement on behalf of the plaintiff which will allow 
the plaintiff and her successors in interest to traverse over and obtain access to the plaintiffs 
property. It is further reasonable and proper that the defendant may develop or sell the property 
awarded to him, but he will not live on the property in the event a home is built on the property. 
The dimensions of the easement are the road as presently used and occupied. 
11. It is reasonable and proper that the defendant be awarded all right, title and 
interest in and to the Fountain Green property consisting of approximately 6.80 acres. 
12. It is reasonable and proper that the defendant be awarded all right, title and 
interest in the real property located in Mexico. 
13. It is reasonable and proper that the defendant be awarded all right, title and 
interest in and to the retirement plan he has accumulated at his place of employment, 
Intermountam Farmers Association, commonly known as Intermountam Farmers Association 
401K Retirement Plan. 
14. It is reasonable and proper that the defendant be awarded all right, title and 
interest in and to the radio station with call letters KTUR, consisting of stock, real property and 
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personal property. The defendant shall assume all obligations associated with said radio station 
and hold the plaintiff harmless therefrom. 
15. It is understood that some or all of the real property being awarded to the 
plaintiff and the defendant may be held in a family trust. The plaintiff and defendant shall direct 
the trustee of the trust to take all actions necessary so the properties are divided as set forth 
herein. 
16. It is reasonable and proper that the plaintiff assume the following debts and 
obligations and shall hold the defendant harmless therefrom: Discover credit card in the 
approximate amount of $2,000.00; MasterCard in the approximate amount of $2,000.00; and 
Visa credit card in the approximate amount of $2,000.00, held in her name. 
17. It is reasonable and proper that the defendant pay to the plaintiff the sum of 
$1,000.00 for attorney fees, said sum to be paid on or before May 31, 1996. 
18. It is reasonable and proper that the defendant pay to the accounting firm of 
Hawkins, Cloward & Simister the sum of $300.00 towards fees incurred by said accounting 
firm. It is understood that the defendant has heretofore paid to said accounting firm the sum of 
$2,400.00. 
19. It is reasonable and proper that the defendant assume the following obligations 
and shall hold the plaintiff harmless therefrom: attorney fees incurred with the firm of Howard, 
Lewis & Petersen; James Knell, orthodontist, in the approximate amount of $3,200.00; Zions 
Bank MasterCard in the approximate amount of $3,944.00; Zions Bank line of credit in the 
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approximate amount of $100,000.00; IFA Credit Union in the approximate amount of 
$30,000.00; GM MasterCard in the approximate amount of $8,413.00; Nations Bank Visa in 
the approximate amount of $7,906.00; Zions Bank Visa in the approximate amount of 
$14,969.00; 401K loan payment in the approximate amount of $20,000.00; Park Leasing in the 
approximate amount of $90,000.00; Howard Braun in the approximate amount of $12,500.00; 
Contractors Leasing in the approximate amount of $96,000.00; C. F. Turley in the approximate 
amount of $165,000.00; radio station operating debt in the approximate amount of $47,500.00; 
Jones Waldo law firm in the approximate amount of $3,000.00; and First Security Bank Leasing 
in the approximate amount of $9,000.00. 
20. In the event there are other debts incurred by either the plaintiff or the 
defendant which are not set forth herein, each party shall pay for the debt that they have 
incurred. 
21. Each party shall be awarded the personal property now in their possession, 
except for a grandfather clock which shall be delivered to the defendant, as well as a musical 
encyclopedia with records, which shall be delivered to the defendant when the children are no 
longer residing in the home and not using the same for piano lessons, and the Encyclopedia 
Britannica which shall be delivered to the defendant when the children are no longer residing 
in the home. The defendant shall further be awarded his musical records, consisting of both 
Spanish and English, and his personal paraphernalia located on the premises awarded to the 
plaintiff. 
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22. It is reasonable and proper that with respect to life insurance policies held in 
the names of the parties, said policies shall be kept in full force and effect with the minor 
children designated as beneficiaries. At such time as the children are no longer minors, the 
parties shall be free to do with the policies as they see fit. For the policies on which the 
plaintiff is designated the owner, she may designate new beneficiaries when the children are no 
longer minors; for the policies on which the defendant is designated the owner, he may designate 
new beneficiaries when the children are no longer minors. It is understood that there is a policy 
insuring the defendant's life through Intermountain Farmers Association, which is owned by 
Intermountain Farmers Association, and that International Farmers Association may terminate 
said policy at any time it desires. Each party shall take physical possession of the policies on 
which they are designated as owner. 
23. It is reasonable and proper that the defendant maintain health insurance through 
his employer so long as it is available at a reasonable cost. Any medical expenses incurred on 
behalf of the minor children which are not paid for by insurance shall be paid 50% by the 
plaintiff and 50% by the defendant. 
24. It is reasonable and proper that the plaintiff be awarded the 1986 GMC 
Suburban and the 1989 Oldsmobile Cutlass. At such time as the 1986 GMC Suburban and the 
1989 Oldsmobile Cutlass are paid for, title shall be delivered forthwith to the plaintiff. Until 
the obligations are satisfied, the defendant shall pay for the vehicle insurance. 
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25. It is reasonable and proper that the defendant be awarded the 1988 Chevrolet 
pickup truck and the 1986 Buick automobile. 
26. It is reasonable and proper that each party will execute such deeds and 
documents necessary to implement the terms of the orders of the Court. 
From the foregoing Findings of Fact, the Court now makes and enters the following: 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1. The plaintiff is entitled to a decree of divorce divorcing her from the defendant, 
said decree to become final and absolute upon signing and filing of the same in the office of the 
Clerk of the Court. 
2. The plaintiff and defendant are entitled to judgment consistent with the 
foregoing Findings of Fact. 
DATED this *7 day of February, 1996. 
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IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF UTAH COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
JULIETTE TURLEY, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
ROBERT WALTERS TURLEY, 
Defendant. 
DECREE OF DIVORCE 
Case No.-91440002-
Judge Howard H. Maetani 
The above-entitled matter came on regularly for trial on December 14, 1995. The 
plaintiff appeared in person and was represented by her attorney, Rosemond Blakelock; the 
defendant appeared in person and was represented by his attorney, Don R. Petersen. The parties 
entered into a stipulation, which was presented to the Court and approved. The Court having 
heretofore entered its Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, and being fully advised in the 
premises, now makes and enters the following: 
DECREE OF DIVORCE 
1. The plaintiff is awarded a decree of divorce divorcing her from the defendant, 
which decree shall become final and absolute upon signing and filing of the same in the office 
of the Clerk of the Court. 
2. The plaintiff and defendant are hereby awarded joint custody of the minor 
children of the parties, to-wit: Christine Turley, born March 6, 1979; and Brian Judd Turley, 
born January 14, 1982, with the plaintiff being awarded residential and physical custody of the 
children and the defendant being awarded reasonable rights of visitation. 
3. The defendant is ordered to pay to the plaintiff child support in the sum of 
$1,300.00 per month for support and maintenance of the two minor children. Said sum shall 
be paid in semi-monthly installments of $650.00 each to be paid on the 5th and 20th days of 
each month, beginning on the 5th day of January, 1996. Child support shall continue until the 
minor children reach the age of 18 years or graduate from high school with their normal 
matriculated class, whichever occurs last. 
4. The defendant is ordered to pay to the plaintiff alimony in the sum of $ 1,500.00 
per month for the plaintiffs support and maintenance. Said sum shall be paid in semi-monthly 
installments of $750.00 each to be paid on the 5th and 20th days of each month, beginning on 
the 5th day of January, 1996. 
5. The provisions of Utah Code Ann. § 62A-11-401 are not implemented at this 
time, provided all payments for child support and alimony are taken directly from the 
defendant's checking account automatically and deposited into a checking account designated by 
the plaintiff. Payments for child support and alimony shall be made by automatic transfer from 
the defendant's bank account at Zions First National Bank, 2100 South 900 West, Salt Lake 
City, Utah, account number 07346943, into plaintiffs bank account at Bank of American Fork, 
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Alpine Branch, Alpine, Utah, account number 0186452; $650.00 on the 5th day of each month 
and $650.00 on the 20th day of each month. 
6. The defendant is granted the right to claim the minor children for income tax 
exemptions. 
7. The defendant's income from Intermountain Farmers will terminate on May 31, 
1996, at which time he will no longer receive income from Intermountain Farmers; however, 
in the event the defendant's income does not terminate, the amounts paid for child support shall 
continue as set forth above. With respect to alimony, alimony shall increase in the amount that 
child support decreases when the minor children reach their majority, only so long as the 
defendant's income is based upon historical earnings of $181,000.00 per year. 
8. The plaintiff is awarded all right, title and interest in and to the family home 
of the parties located at approximately 1221 North Grove Drive, Alpine, Utah, subject to the 
obligation owed thereon to Lomas Mortgage Company in the approximate amount of 
$20,000.00, which obligation the plaintiff is ordered to assume and hold the defendant harmless 
therefrom. The defendant is ordered to execute a quit claim deed in favor of the plaintiff. Said 
property consists of a home and approximately 1.1 acres, subject to an easement on the south 
side of the property in favor of the defendant or his successors in interest by which to gain 
access to the barn and property located thereon, said access being 24 feet in width, which 
property is awarded to the defendant. The defendant is ordered to forthwith execute a quit claim 
deed conveying his interest in said property to the plaintiff. 
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9. The plaintiff is awarded all right, title and interest in and to a cabin in which 
the parties have an interest located in proximity to the Smith Moorehouse Reservoir in Summit 
County, Utah. The defendant is ordered to execute a quit claim deed in favor of the plaintiff. 
10. The defendant is awarded all right, title and interest in and to approximately 
3.89 acres of property located on the east and west sides of the home property awarded to the 
plaintiff. The plaintiff is ordered to execute a quit claim deed conveying her right, title and 
interest in said property to the defendant. The defendant's 3.89 acres of property shall be 
subject to an easement in favor of the plaintiff which will allow the plaintiff and her successors 
in interest to traverse over and obtain access to the plaintiffs property. The defendant may 
develop or sell the property awarded to him, but he will not live on the property in the event 
a home is built on the property. The dimensions of the easement are the road as presently used 
and occupied* The plaintiff is ordered to execute a quit claim deed conveying her interest in the 
said property to the defendant. 
11. The defendant is awarded all right, title and interest in and to the Fountain 
Green property consisting of approximately 6.80 acres. The plaintiff is ordered to execute a quit 
claim deed conveying her interest in the said property to the defendant. 
12. The defendant is awarded all right, title and interest in the real property located 
in Mexico. 
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13. The defendant is awarded all right, title and interest in and to the retirement 
plan he has accumulated at his place of employment, Intermountain Farmers Association, 
commonly known as Intermountain Farmers Association 40IK Retirement Plan. 
14. The defendant is awarded all right, title and interest in and to the radio station 
with call letters KTUR, consisting of stock, real property and personal property. The defendant 
is ordered to assume all obligations incurred in connection with the radio station and to hold the 
plaintiff harmless therefrom. 
15. The plaintiff is ordered to assume the following debts and obligations and to 
hold the defendant harmless therefrom: Lomas Mortgage Company in the approximate amount 
of $20,000.00; Discover credit card in the approximate amount of $2,000.00; MasterCard in the 
approximate amount of $2,000.00; and Visa credit card in the approximate amount of $2,000.00. 
16. The defendant is ordered to pay to the plaintiffs counsel the sum of $1,000.00 
for attorney fees, said sum to be paid on or before May 31, 1996. 
17. The defendant is ordered to pay to the accounting firm of Hawkins, Cloward 
& Simister the sum of $300.00 towards fees incurred by said accounting firm. 
18. The defendant is ordered to assume the following obligations and to hold the 
plaintiff harmless therefrom: attorney fees incurred with the firm of Howard, Lewis & Petersen; 
James Knell, orthodontist, in the approximate amount of $3,200.00; Zions Bank MasterCard in 
the approximate amount of $3,944.00; Zions Bank line of credit in the approximate amount of 
$100,000.00; IFA Credit Union in the approximate amount of $30,000.00; GM MasterCard in 
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the approximate amount of $8,413.00; Nations Bank Visa in the approximate amount of 
$7,906.00; Zions Bank Visa in the approximate amount of $14,969.00; 401K loan payment in 
the approximate amount of $20,000.00; Park Leasing in the approximate amount of $90,000.00; 
Howard Braun in the approximate amount of $12,500.00; Contractors Leasing in the 
approximate amount of $96,000.00; C. F. Turley in the approximate amount of $165,000.00; 
radio station operating debt in the approximate amount of $47,500.00; Jones Waldo law firm 
in the approximate amount of $3,000.00; and First Security Bank Leasing in the approximate 
amount of $9,000.00. 
19. In the event there are other debts incurred by either the plaintiff or the 
defendant which are not set forth herein, each party is ordered to pay for the debt that they have 
incurred. 
20. Each party is awarded the personal property now in their possession, except for 
a grandfather clock and a musical encyclopedia with records, which are awarded to the defendant 
and shall be delivered to the defendant when minor children are no longer residing in the home 
or not using the same for piano lessons, together with the Encyclopedia Britannica, which shall 
be delivered to the defendant when minor children are no longer residing in the home. The 
defendant is further awarded his musical records, consisting of both Spanish and English, and 
his personal paraphernalia located on the premises awarded to the plaintiff. 
21. With respect to life insurance policies held in the names of the parties, said 
policies shall be kept in full force and effect with the minor children designated as beneficiaries. 
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At such time as the children are no longer minors, the parties shall be free to do with the 
policies as they see fit. For the policies on which the plaintiff is designated the owner, she may 
designate new beneficiaries when the children are no longer minors; for the policies on which 
the defendant is designated the owner, he may designate new beneficiaries when the children are 
no longer minors. It is understood that there is a policy insuring the defendant's life through 
Intermountain Farmers Association, which is owned by Intermountain Farmers Association, and 
that it may terminate said policy at any time it desires. Each party is awarded physical 
possession of the life insurance policies on which they are designated as the owner. 
22. The defendant is ordered to maintain health insurance through his employer so 
long as it is available at a reasonable cost. Any medical expenses incurred on behalf of the 
minor children which are not paid for by insurance will be paid 50% by the plaintiff and 50% 
by the defendant. In the event the plaintiff desires to obtain health insurance through any 
existing COBRA plans, the defendant shall cooperate in executing such documents so that the 
plaintiff may obtain coverage, which shall be maintained at plaintiffs expense. 
23. The plaintiff is awarded the 1986 GMC Suburban and the 1989 Oldsmobile 
Cutlass. At such time as the obligations owed on the 1986 GMC Suburban and the 1989 
Oldsmobile Cutlass are satisfied, titles to those vehicles shall be delivered to the plaintiff. Until 
the obligations are satisfied, the defendant shall pay for the vehicle insurance. 
24. The defendant is awarded the 1988 Chevrolet pickup truck and 1986 Buick 
automobile. 
7 
25. Each party is ordered to execute such deeds and documents necessary to 
implement the terms of this Decree of Divorce. 
DATED this 7 day of January jffifr. 
APPROVED AS TO FOR 
ROSAMOND BLAKELOCK, ESQ. 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
BY THE COURT V£J£.**. 
J:\DRP\TURLEY.DEC 
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